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**An Appraisal of Intelligence Sources and Analyses
in the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and
in the Rise of Hua Kuo-feng**

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PREFACE

National foreign intelligence products are frequently judged by policymakers using the criteria of quality, timeliness, utility and relevance. This suggests that a product's value is assessed with favor when future events are predicted with reasonable accuracy; or, as a minimum, when policymaking officials are provided with insights, gained through intelligence sources and methods, that enable them to better understand and deal with dynamic or complex situations. Events surrounding the political succession in China following the deaths of Premier Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao Tse-tung have been cited as an instance in which the Community failed to meet these criteria due to analytical shortcomings.

This study was conducted to assess the Intelligence Community's political reporting on China; however, the focus has been narrowed to allow in-depth examination of intelligence sources and methods applied to one aspect of political reporting: the political fortunes of two Chinese leaders between 1965 and 1975, notably:

- The rise and fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and
- The rise of Hua Kuo-feng.

In conducting the study it was further hoped that the findings and conclusions concerning the adequacy of sources and methods applied to these key targets from 1965-1975 would produce meaningful judgments of general applicability regarding intelligence coverage of Chinese political developments.

As a first step, an experienced CIA China specialist prepared a draft study under Intelligence Community Staff auspices on intelligence coverage of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hua Kuo-feng during the 1965-1975 period. As a second step, the Intelligence Community Staff sponsored a detailed review of the draft's contents and conclusions by convening a broadly representative panel of analysts and consumers of national foreign intelligence products on China within the National Security Council, Department of State, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This panel assessed the judgments made therein on the strength and weaknesses of intelligence coverage of the two personalities in focus, as well as conclusions offered on the adequacy of sources and methods on Chinese political developments in general. Results of this review have been incorporated in the study and its principal judgments.

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PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS

1. Despite the weaknesses evident in predicting leadership changes, overall intelligence assessments on China have been reasonably accurate. A review of the sources and analytical methods used in these studies supports this judgment.
2. The intelligence community has evolved a broad range of source data, a fairly good mix of media coverage, diplomatic contacts and clandestine collection despite the closed nature of Chinese society and the many complexities clouding the decision making process.
3. Chinese leadership studies lean heavily on open media analysis. Use of the media has been complicated by obvious party factionalism over its control and Chinese penchant for masking controversy in abstruse analogy and innuendo.
4. US intelligence appraisals need to be weighed against methods applied and conclusions drawn by other countries or sources. Illustrative of this, our interpretations involving the two cases under review parallel inferences drawn by the US academic community and foreign governmental analysts.
5. The sheer range and volume of materials involved, uneven or delayed processing times, difficult retrieval, authentication, and coordinating mechanisms, combine to make the analyst's task a formidable one. The Chinese language itself becomes a near insuperable barrier when the regime chooses to backtrack through the centuries to shadow box by literary or historical analogy.
6. Intelligence products dealing with China suffer from too much emphasis upon current analyses or long-term research studies. More emphasis needs to be applied to producing mid-term analyses, highlighting trends and assessing their potential impact on US policies.
7. In the past few years, academic scholars have begun to question and to assess the various models and methods by which we interpret Chinese politics. The intelligence community should seek their contributions as we move into the post-Mao era.

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An Appraisal of Intelligence Sources and Analyses in the Fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and in the Rise of Hua Kuo-feng

INTRODUCTION

In late November 1975, intelligence memoranda in support of the President's trip to China identified then Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing as the man clearly slated to succeed ailing Premier Chou En-lai, as the man already running China on a daily basis, and as the key figure in the PRC leadership picture after the death of Chou and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. Entrusted by Chou—Teng did greet, host, and talk with President Ford in his early December visit to Peking. The following month Chou died. Teng read out Chou's eulogy on 15 January and then disappeared from public view.

In February, a relatively unknown leader, Hua Kuo-feng, was named Acting Premier. A propaganda campaign against Teng was touched off which climaxed in April 1976 when Teng was stripped of all his state and party posts. Hua moved quickly to consolidate his advantage. After Mao's death in the fall of 1976, Hua succeeded to Mao's leadership position and quickly purged Mao's wife and the Shanghai radical benefactors of the Cultural Revolution with her.

It is fair to say that Teng's fall and Hua's rise took China watchers in the intelligence community wholly by surprise. What then, had happened? Given the limits within which we operate, were there not yet weaknesses which kept us from predicting Teng's fall from power little more than a month after he met with the President? Were there blind spots that prevented us from focusing on Hua's remarkable rise to the top?

The question of Mao's successor has been a primary intelligence target for many years, yet no observers were suggesting Hua as a serious contender. Our many surprises in reporting the ebb and flow of Chinese leadership politics over the past decade and more—the demise of Liu Shao-ch'i, the fall of Lin Piao, Teng,

and the "gang of four"—oblige us to look back on the validity of our sources as well as our methods of interpreting them. If we fail to come up with the right answers, are we then posing the wrong questions, gathering the wrong information, or approaching the target with faulty analytical assumptions or poor models?

The purpose of this study is to examine the use of sources and analytical assumptions as they related to Teng's fall and Hua's rise to power. The data on these two leaders is treated separately in a way that is necessary artificial and delimiting, but the intent is to focus on possible problems with sources and methods relating to the broad issues of Chinese leadership analysis. These are surveyed at the conclusion of this paper. Appended is a sampling of biographic data, sources, and analytical comment on Hua Kuo-feng.

Discussion

A. *The Rise and Fall of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.* Teng's case is hard to isolate from the larger fabric of Chinese politics over the past few decades and is almost uniquely difficult to assess. There are no precedents in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history for so dramatic a fall, return, then fall once again from high political office. Evaluation of the Chinese leadership picture presumes some general awareness of party history and the rich Chinese cultural milieu in which it unfolds. How does a proud, tough party veteran like Teng react to abrupt dismissal at the peak of his career, then to his recall to office at the age of 70? Whatever the external framework and the constitutional or political processes at play, much obviously depends on the personal character of the man himself. One of the party's hard-core veterans from Szechuan Province in the Southwest, Teng spent some early years in France with Chou En-lai; afterwards he distinguished himself with many years of successful

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administrative experience within the party and with the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

By 1965, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Teng had long since become General Secretary of the CCP; with Mao, Chou, Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao he was considered one of China's top leaders. But in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, he was suddenly cut down as "number two capitalist roader" within the party after Liu-Shao-ch'i. While official media did not name or condemn Teng as it had Liu—the Cultural Revolution's principal target—scores of unofficial Red Guard tracts did hit at Teng by name in the context of struggle against the Liu-Teng line, attacks which spelled out Teng's crimes in almost every conceivable category. He was accused of demonstrating unpardonable arrogance toward Mao; of maligning Mao's general line on the communes, the leap forward, on educational and cultural programs, and of shielding and promoting family, friends, and cronies. Subsequently, Teng was believed to have written a satisfactory self-criticism, but he dropped completely from public life. Red Guard publications in later stages of the Cultural Revolution, one attributed to Shanghai's radical leader Yao Wen-yuan, speculated on whether the likes of Liu or Teng could be rehabilitated at the Ninth Party Congress scheduled for April 1969. Teng was not reinstated at that Congress, but shortly afterwards rumors began to circulate as to his possible redemption. Then in April 1973, Teng did make his dramatic but timid seeming re-entry onto the national political scene as a vice-premier, presumably with the concurrence of both Chairman Mao and Premier Chou. There was no public mention of Teng's prior mistakes or of his self-criticism. From that moment forward, Teng gradually gained power within the party hierarchy, which seemed even greater than he enjoyed in the past. By late 1975, it was generally presumed Teng was being groomed to succeed Chou as Premier or even to succeed Mao himself.

Given Teng's vulnerability as a top-level victim of the Cultural Revolution, the obvious resistance to his return to power by the "Shanghai radicals" in the central leadership—those who had benefited by Teng's fall and were threatened by his return—was it too optimistic to assume Teng was a man slated to succeed? Examination of the available evidence strongly suggests that this was not the case.

From the first day of Teng's return to grace there did seem to be indirect and guarded sniping against him in the media by innuendo through historical or

literary analogy. Mao's wife, the focus for the Shanghai group, seemed to avoid appearing in public with Teng in the first few months of his return. Such tensions were noted and speculated upon by intelligence analysts. This had to be weighed against other open media evidence which clearly indicated Teng's star was on the rise. Diplomatic and clandestine sources were also confirming the strength of Teng's position on all sides. A number of sources relayed Mao's alleged pleasure with Teng's administrative talents, his desire to endorse Teng as Chou's successor.

Making his initial appearance as Vice Premier of the State Council in the spring of 1973, Teng was restored to the Party Central Committee at the 10th Party Congress in August of that year. By January 1974, Teng regained Politburo standing and a position as Vice-Chairman on the Military Affairs Commission. In January 1975, it was reliably, though not publicly reported, that Teng had also been named Army Chief-of-Staff. In April 1974, Teng's standing was measurably enhanced when he was chosen to head the PRC delegation to the UN General Assembly Special Session on World Resources, and, in May 1975, Teng made another prestigious trip, this time to France where he received head of state treatment and made a strong impression on French leaders with whom he spoke.

Despite occasional media sniping which could be and was interpreted as an attack on Teng's return to power, the open and obvious evidence of his restoration and grooming seemed incontestable throughout 1974 and 1975. On the international scene, Teng met foreign leadership delegations in company with Mao and/or Chou, one after another. As Chou's health worsened, Teng increasingly met and hosted heads of state, US congressional, educational and other delegations—in Chou's name. While Teng was deemed not so urbane as Chou, nor as knowledgeable on foreign affairs as Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, there seemed no question of his authority, poise, and confidence. He did not hesitate to lecture Secretary Kissinger on the US need to put the larger interests of NATO ahead of petty squabbling with France in order to counter the Soviet threat. Observations by USLO officers and many American and foreign visitors were uniform in concurring that Teng was the man "in the driver's seat."

On the domestic front, Teng appeared equally authoritative. Most of his average 20 appearances a month through the year 1975 appeared devoted to meeting foreign visitors. Clandestine intelligence

informed us Teng was giving major speeches on national defense priorities and military reorganization, on national planning, science and technology, education and culture. He delivered the keynote speech for the National Agricultural Conference at Tachai in September, a meeting billed as the most important of its kind since 1949. Clandestine intelligence reported that Teng's speech was circulated at PRC embassies abroad for study. These sources also reported Teng giving speeches during 1975 sharply critical of both military and industrial departments, declaring them "lax and flabby" and not properly organized for defense or production. Teng was even reported instrumental in arranging the dramatic rotation of 8 of the 11 PRC's powerful military region commanders toward the end of 1973, a feat that allegedly won Mao's high praise. Again, Teng had not hesitated to send troops into Chekiang Province to quell serious unrest there after the youthful Wang Hung-wen of the Shanghai radical leadership faction was unable to solve the problem. Such activity may have generated rumors and gossip that Mao was urging Wang "to learn from Teng," conveying the outward impression that Teng had the inside track with the Chairman.

All of this strongly suggested to intelligence analysts that Teng was being prepared step-by-step to succeed Chou as premier and perhaps ultimately, Mao as Party Chairman too. To be sure, Teng bore the stigma of his Cultural Revolution dismissal, but properly played, this could well have proved more an asset than a liability. Goals and methods of the Cultural Revolution had been publicly discredited; many of those most closely associated with it were purged, demoted, or on the defensive. At the same time, an ever growing number of party leaders dismissed during the Cultural Revolution were returning to positions of power and influence, sometimes with the insinuation they had been framed or sinned against by the Cultural Revolution. As a group, these rehabilitees had experienced long, bleak years of personal humiliation and political isolation at the hands of Mao's Shanghai radicals. Their common fate might reasonably have forged a "Long March" bond among them; many would look to Teng as representative of their cause, the man who had lived through it with them.

At least one PRC source reported that Teng's dismissal during the Cultural Revolution had been a mistake and that Teng had been "maliciously slandered" and framed by the Lin Piao faction. Another source abroad said Teng was victimized during the Revolution but had held his ground and been proved right. As the number of rehabilitated party and army

leaders began to grow, analysts presumed Teng had a hand in redeeming many he had been close to previously to enhance his power base. Thus a number of high level rehabilitees in both the party and army at national and provincial levels were former Teng associates.

Teng could also count on considerable strength within the PLA. He had served 17 years in commissar capacity with the Second Field Army and had directly commanded combined operations of the Second and Third Field Armies in crucial engagements in 1948 and 1949. Many former army colleagues like Liu Po-ch'eng, Chu Te, Li Hsien-nien, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Li Te-sheng, and Su Chen-hua were staffing key positions in the Politburo, in PLA Headquarters, and regional commands as Teng resumed his rise to the top. It was not unreasonable to infer that Teng enjoyed the support and respect of many of the veteran army commanders, buttressed by his appointments as Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission and PLA Chief-of-Staff.

Most of our intelligence then seemed to point overwhelmingly to the strength of Teng's position and to a carefully orchestrated program to insure his succession to the premiership. It was also the general judgment of Commonwealth, West European and Japanese leaders and diplomats visiting or stationed in Peking or Hong Kong. China watchers in the Soviet Union were also pegging Teng as the key man in the leadership, as were PRC diplomats and representatives abroad.

comment

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Official PRC contacts in Hong Kong, Japan, Washington and Europe appeared as surprised as anyone when Teng was not named Premier. This was particularly true in Hong Kong where contacts seemed relatively more attuned to the leadership situation in Peking. In February 1976, PRC spokesmen were still insisting Teng "was not finished."

Although Teng was endorsed by Mao and Chou, invested with key leadership positions with the highest international and domestic responsibilities, and possessed a power base among the rehabilitated and in the higher reaches of the PLA, there were discernible

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obstacles in his path. His age was a mixed blessing, an asset in terms of experience and party respect for its elders, but also a liability in the wake of the illness and death engulfing his generation of peers and protectors. While he received good press, there seemed little doubt that veiled swipes at his return to power did appear by way of inference and innuendo in many political campaigns waged after Teng resumed power. While the radical opposition presumably had to acknowledge Teng's return to prominence officially, they apparently made use of their access to the media to attack him indirectly. Especially pointed was the use of a Confucian setting to rail against the "Duke of Chou's" policy of "returning officials who had retired to obscurity." Obviously this was aimed at Chou's policy of redeeming party leaders struck down by the Cultural Revolution, chief of whom was Teng.

A Canton source reported that the campaign to "restrict bourgeois rights" in the spring of 1975 was likewise meant to zero in on Teng, vulnerable as a former "capitalist roader." In the summer of 1975, the highly ambiguous but polemical attack in the classical novel *Water Margin* led to speculation that Teng was the intended target, as was publicly acknowledged in the spring of 1976. But it was not easy to tie this campaign to an attack on Teng at the time; indeed, a better case could have been made that the target was Mao himself. PRC contacts in Hong Kong and elsewhere purported not to know the real significance of the campaign, often denying that it was aimed at anyone in particular. One source even allowed how Teng was directing this campaign at Mao's behest. In late summer of 1975, still another campaign unfolded, this time against those backtracking on educational policies instituted during the Cultural Revolution. This attack was ostensibly directed at the Minister of Education, but the charges were similar to those levelled against Teng during the Cultural Revolution in 1967. A long-standing critic of the party's educational policies insofar as he felt they hampered the development of skills needed to modernize Chinese society, Teng was probably justifiably accused of undermining these measures. By December 1975, current intelligence analysts had concluded that criticism on the educational front was in fact directed at Teng.

Estimates of prospects for succeeding to the premiership were, of course, predicated on intelligence as to the strength of those opposing him. There were many unknowns in this area, particularly the stand of Mao himself, although both sources and analyses were pointing to Madame Mao and the

Shanghai radicals as the opposition. Estimates seemed generally agreed, however, that while the radicals had great capacity for fomenting trouble, they had steadily lost ground since their peak period of influence during the Cultural Revolution. The PLA had restored a conservative order in the provinces at the expense of Red Guard factionalism; party leaders struck down were coming back to positions of power, and radical leaders and policies were phasing out. Above all, the men chosen by Mao to lead the Cultural Revolution, Ch'en Po-ta and Lin Piao, had themselves been put down as co-conspirators against the party.

Good intelligence sources in 1974 and 1975 indicated that Mao was attempting to put a damper on his wife's political ambitions and those of her Shanghai friends. It also appeared that Shanghai's Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was being counterweighted against Teng in key leadership roles and posed a potential threat to Teng. But reports of Chang's character and style as more in the mold of Chou En-lai led some analysts to conjecture that perhaps Chang had been co-opted by the moderate faction and that he was no longer so easily identified with the radical opposition. Chang's quick fall with the gang of four, however, seemed to render this assumption wrong.

Teng's own personality seems the most complex variable in the estimate of his future leadership status. By most accounts, he comes off extremely able but equally abrasive. Teng obviously prefers to have his way and to stand his ground; he finds it difficult to toady or defer to those above or around him. In his earlier time of troubles, Mao complained that Teng paid him no mind and stood aloof. Reports of his administrative and diplomatic style all indicate he has more grit than graciousness. Far from being chastened by the Cultural Revolution, he seems bent on resisting all it stood for. Allegedly he blames the disorder and de-centralization of the national economy on policies of the Cultural Revolution. On resuming authority, he dressed down army commanders and fellow bureaucrats alike as lax and lazy. In all this he was undoubtedly a hero to some but a threat to others. We are left to speculate on whether a little more diplomacy or deference on Teng's part might have precluded his fall from power a second time.

On balance, it is hard to fault the general intelligence assessment of Teng's leadership position in the late fall of 1975. On the first page of the intelligence memorandum for the President's trip in November, Teng himself is cited as saying that the succession (to Mao) "whenever it occurs, is likely to be

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troubled." While the memorandum names Teng as Chou's successor, it also labels him "far more controversial than Chou ever was" and predicts that Teng will have trouble reconciling the various factions bidding for power after the death of Mao and Chou. A re-examination of the sources and methods working in the intelligence community up to the time of Teng's fall makes it difficult to believe that the assessment of Teng's position in November 1975 could have been substantially different from the one rendered.

B. The Rise of Hua Kuo-feng. In September 1976 Mao Tse-tung died, and, in the following month, Hua Kuo-feng succeeded him as head of the CCP and the PLA. Hua's take-over of Mao's position did not occasion as much surprise as his earlier appointment as Acting Premier, following Chou's death in January. Still this relatively obscure provincial leader seemed suddenly to rise up and assume all the top leadership positions in China, bumping odds-on favorite Teng, Mao's favored Shanghai radicals, and other more probable contenders as well. On the surface, at least, Hua has also appeared to spike prospects of a collegial or collective-style leadership in the post-Mao interim, a course of action many observers felt likely.

As the annex to this paper shows, Hua's career was being passively recorded from provincial radio broadcasts in the late 1950s and 1960s as he worked his way up into the Hunan bureaucracy, as scores of other party cadres were doing in 30-odd other provincial or municipal units. But Hunan was Mao's native province and generally regarded as a more propitious place for a capable young cadre to be noticed. Hua was luckier still in that he worked in the vicinity of the native counties of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i. He appeared to know how to take advantage of this situation and was placed in charge of a showcase irrigation project servicing both counties. Hua also initiated work on a railway spur to link Mao's village to the outside world and set about refurbishing and expanding commemorative halls in Mao's honor.

During the 1960s and up to the Cultural Revolution in 1966, broadcast information made it obvious that Hua was indeed an activist in agriculture. He presided over meetings and gave reports on many aspects of farming as carried on the Hunan provincial capital radio at Ch'ang-sha. But it was also apparent that Hua's ambitions or talents lay beyond agriculture. He gave speeches on a variety of subjects, including public security, militia training, youth, education, and science and technology. Hua also met and feted foreign delegations that passed through Hunan, usher-

ing them around Mao's native place. This undoubtedly provided Hua opportunities to polish or demonstrate his style and to get to know the high-ranking leaders from Peking who frequently squired important visitors to Hunan. Hua delivered a number of set speeches in this period against "US imperialist" activities in Vietnam, charging that the bombing of North Vietnam posed a threat to China. In October 1964, Hua took part in a major public security "cultural festival" attended by Peking leader Yeh Chien-ying and senior security officials from six other provinces. Yeh and Central-South military leaders delivered "important instructions," and Hua spoke at the meetings too. While all those activities may have been common and prosaic enough, it does demonstrate that something of a grooming process was already at work, providing Hua with specialized experience in agriculture and a broader, generalized experience in both foreign and domestic matters that would equip him for higher positions later on.

Not nearly enough is known of Hua's activities or relationships in Hunan during the hectic days of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). Posters in 1974 would denounce him for suppression of the Cultural Revolution in Hunan, but apparently, Hua managed to move through this troubled period relatively unscathed, surely a tribute to his instincts for survival. A June 1976 source, a Ch'ang-sha university professor, recalled Hua's canny ability to switch back and forth between radical and conservative factions in Hunan during the Cultural Revolution, thus avoiding the fate of his friend and superior at the time, First Secretary Chang P'ing-hua.

Hunan was a key area of Cultural Revolution upheaval, in part perhaps because it was the home of the two major antagonists, Mao and his first assumed successor, Liu Shao-ch'i. Beyond the intrinsic importance of Hunan as Mao's home, the province also came under the administrative control of the Central-South Bureau, managed by its powerful chief, T'ao Chu from Canton. T'ao Chu vaulted to the "number 4" position in the Peking party hierarchy during the Cultural Revolution, just behind Mao, Lin and Chou. He had taken Hunan's First Secretary Chang with him to Peking to help manage the propaganda machinery. But in just a few months time both T'ao and his "Hunan agent" were cut down as Liu Shao-ch'i's agents from the Central-South. Also, Hunan was under the administration of the Canton Military Region (MR), reputedly the stronghold of Defense Minister Lin Piao at that time. Military leaders presumed loyal to Lin were later moved into Hunan to help settle

down Cultural Revolution excesses there. Again, that Hua was able to navigate through these treacherous waters and avoid the stigma first of T'ao Chu and later of Lin's men, seemed a tribute to his flexibility—or to the standing of his patrons in Peking.

Hua had appeared with T'ao Chu in June 1966 at a ceremony to open the highly publicized irrigation works to water the home counties of Mao and Liu. T'ao praised the project (overseen by Hua) as one of the principal irrigation efforts in China. Fifteen months later, in a September 1967 Red Guard publication, T'ao and the June irrigation ceremony were criticized as bad. In August 1970, Hua had seemed to go out of his way to praise Lin's loyalty to Mao. At that very time, it was subsequently charged, Lin was plotting to overthrow Mao and the party. But Hua did not appear hurt by his relationship with T'ao Chu nor by his praise of Lin; in fact, it rather appeared that after Lin's fall, Hua's star as a national leader first began to rise. It was also at this time China watchers began taking a closer look at Hua's political fortunes.

Even before this, in May 1969, OCI analysts had noted that Hua's election to the Central Committee of the Ninth Party Congress in April had boosted him over his nominal superior in Hunan, First Secretary Li Yuan, who had only been named a Committee alternate at this congress. Hua was in Peking for National Day in October 1969, then returned to Hunan where he continued to meet foreign delegations and give "important speeches" and instructions. In January 1970, OCI had inferred friction between Li Yuan and Hua over the PLA's political role in Hunan. Li, Commander of the 47th Army, had come into Hunan in August 1967 as a stabilizing force during the Cultural Revolution. By May 1970, Hua Kuo-feng had quietly supplanted Li Yuan as First Secretary in Hunan.

Shortly after Lin Piao's demise in September 1971, Hua was called up to Peking. In November 1971, the Hong Kong ConGen saw Hunan as a model and pacesetter in calling the first provincial party congress after Lin's fall. OCI analysts pointed to him as "a provincial leader moving up," citing his vague official identification as a "leading member of various departments" in Peking. Hua began appearing in top leadership groupings from this time, ranking about 10th among the top dozen leaders making appearances in Peking.

In June 1972, Hong Kong ConGen observed that Hua was gaining more prominence after Lin Piao,

and, while he held no official title at the center, appearance of his name, clustered with two others and listed above those with ministerial functions, suggested that all three men may have been elevated to Politburo status. In July, a Canton TV intercept showed close-ups of Hua with Chou En-lai and other top leaders awarding prizes to participants. A Hong Kong USIS assessment of Hua in October 1972 reviewed his rise to power in tandem with Shanghai radical Wang Hung-wen, noting Hua's activities associated with Mao's name and his outmaneuvering of Li Yuan, his rival in Hunan.

In November 1972, Hua acquired an additional regional title as Political Commissar of the Canton MR. OCI and ConGen observers saw this as a stratagem to strengthen Hua's hand as a civilian central leader with respect to pro-Lin Piao influences still lingering in the Canton MR. Previously, the Canton MR's Deputy Political Commissar, Pu Chan-ya, outranked Hua in Hunan and was regarded as a Lin Piao man. Hua's new title was seen as a way to edge Pu out and extend Peking's control over the Canton bailiwick of Lin. This, of course, implied great trust in and more power for Hua. By the end of 1972, Hua was identified as Party First Secretary in Hunan, Acting Chairman of the Hunan Revolutionary Committee and Political Commissar for the Canton MR, concentrating the party, government and military powers of Hunan in Hua's hands, in addition to his still unspecified duties at the center.

In early 1973, Hua left Peking and returned to Hunan. Initial speculation by OCI was that Hua may have been returning to Hunan permanently, with his new title but "to ride a smaller horse." In May, however, a Hong Kong British intelligence report cited a poster observed in Hunan which indicated that Pu Chan-ya had been ousted there as pro-Lin Piao. At about the same time, the UK Regional Information Office in Hong Kong was suggesting that Hua had come back to Hunan just long enough to unseat Pu and install his colleague Chang P'ing-hua as Hunan Secretary-in-Charge before returning to Peking. In the summer of 1973 Hua had returned to Peking and was busy meeting several foreign agricultural delegations, prompting Hong Kong ConGen to speculate that Hua was becoming the regime's authority on agriculture. A good intelligence source in July had picked up Chou En-lai's remark to a Japanese visitor that it was necessary for the younger generation of Japanese leaders to meet their counterparts on the Chinese side, the Chinese successor group. Hua Kuo-feng was one of five named by Chou as future leaders of China.

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Scarcely a month later, at the CCP 10th Congress, Hua was elected to the Politburo.

If Hua's rise to prominence seemed clear sailing up to the 10th Congress, he nonetheless met with a few jolts during the turbulent summer of 1974. USLO and Hong Kong reported that Hua was the target of poster attacks that summer, both in Hunan and Peking. The posters charged Hua with responsibility for killings in the late stages of the Cultural Revolution in Hunan, for suppressing results of the revolution, and for ignoring leaders who had come to power during the revolution. Mention of criticism against Hua came from several quarters, including posters allegedly seen from a train window in Ch'ang-sha by the Soviet military attache, but posters attacking him by name were quickly removed. Press criticism of a Hunanese opera titled "Song of the Gardner" said to vilify educational policy since the Cultural Revolution was interpreted by an AFP correspondent as an indirect attack on Hua. Hua apparently weathered all this criticism well and in June, OCI theorized that criticism of Hua originated with the radical left in Hunan, and it strongly suggested that Hua was not in the radical camp.

25X1C Hua continued active in 1974, despite the criticism. Intelligence reports in April claimed Hua traveled in Canton in connection with an investigation of Lin Piao's former PLA Chief-of-Staff, Huang Yung-sheng. In July of 1974, [REDACTED] assessments of the Chinese leadership to USLO contacts saw Hua as definitely the party boss for agriculture; they also saw Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen of the Shanghai faction as being groomed for Premier and party boss respectively. The ConGen added that Hua took center stage for meetings involving agriculture and that the Minister of Agriculture deferred to him on such occasions. In August, OCI also reported that Hua was a member of the State Council, holding some unspecified position in the upper bureaucracy. Intelligence collected in September 1974 said Hua was a co-chairman of an investigatory commission to determine whether the PRC was ready for another leap forward. A Tokyo message in October pointed up Hua's expressed interest in exporting coal and oil to Japan. Hua was twelfth in the leadership turnout for Army Day in August and third among three leadership groups mingling with the masses for National Day on 1 October, after Chu Te and Yao Wen-yuan. In evening celebrations, Hua was eleventh in the lineup.

In 1975, Hua took on significantly more political clout when he became Minister of Public Security and

sixth of 12 vice-premiers under Chou En-lai after the National People's Congress (NPC) in January. That same month a Soviet contact in Peking observed that abolition of the Procurator General's Office (with judicial and supervisory functions) had greatly strengthened Hua's hand as Minister of Public Security, already the strongest arm of central control in the PRC. He judged Hua to have been Mao's man early on and predicted that Hua was strategically positioned for the coming showdown between radicals and moderates. (Later, in March 1976, a Soviet diplomat noted that the Public Security Ministry enjoys a control function within the PLA; thus, Hua would have his watchdogs in the army, some known, some not.)

Hong Kong ConGen comment on the results of the NPC was that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Hua Kuo-feng emerged as the men to watch. It also found it curious that Hua continued to retain both agricultural and public security responsibilities in addition to his controlling hand in Hunan. In February, a New Zealand agricultural minister visiting Peking found Hua a very engaging politician; "if he had the steel fist, he wore a velvet glove." Hua's remarks led the New Zealander to believe that he was extremely knowledgeable in agriculture and was not in the radical camp. Comment on this New Zealand impression by OCI in March concluded that power was concentrated in a very few hands in Peking and that Hua was very busy and very important in this regard.

Hua maintained his high level visibility throughout 1975, quickly moving into the Liaoning earthquake area with Teng on a comfort mission in March. He brought attention to his new role as Public Security Minister by signing off on the release of the captured Soviet helicopter crew. An April intelligence item contained the view that PRC cadres sensed Hua was highly regarded by Chou En-lai. Hua's stature was boosted considerably as the man presiding over the major agricultural conference at Tachai that fall. A Hong Kong Bank of China official stressed the Tachai meeting as a fundamental turning point for China and noted the significance of the report delivered there by Hua. An NCNA official in Hong Kong volunteered that Hua did a variety of jobs because that was normal procedure for a Vice-Premier and that Hua was "among the Vice Premiers in the best physical condition." In leadership turnouts in 1975, Hua was tenth on May Day, sixth at an Army Day reception.

Early in January 1976, Chou En-lai died, and Hua appeared tenth on the funeral committee after Mao.

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Teng gave Chou's eulogy on 15 January and was almost universally expected to assume the Premiership. On 23 January, however, an NCNA official in Hong Kong conjectured that perhaps neither Teng nor Chang would become Premier. Hua was "unfathomable" but active and much trusted by Mao. On 26 January, the New Zealand Ambassador to China claimed that he was far more impressed with Hua than Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and had long heard that Hua was a man to watch but had not believed it until he met him. In early February, an experienced Japanese source had been assured through his CCP liaison connection that Teng would succeed Chou. On 7 February came the surprise announcement that Hua was named "Acting Premier."

The Soviets, travellers from Canton, the French, were all taken completely by surprise. A Peking junior official alluded to Hua as a "nobody." Japanese officials were dubious of Hua's staying power, his lack of experience in industrial matters, and his lack of finesse in foreign affairs. A PRC electrician exiting to Hong Kong said that 99 percent of the common people in China had never heard of Hua and that Teng should have been the rightful Premier.

Perhaps enough has been drawn from Hua's file to indicate that he did not come as a complete surprise to the intelligence community however unfamiliar he was to the man in the street. Sources and analysts had Hua in reasonably close focus; by 1975, most analysts would have judged Hua among the top five to ten leaders in the PRC. The importance of agriculture is generally recognized and so too is the public security portfolio. But Hua was, after all, a sixth-ranking Vice-Premier and eleventh ranking on the Politburo. There were more senior leadership candidates in front of him, and there seemed no question that the rehabilitated Teng was being groomed to assume Chou's mantle as Premier. Were Teng to falter, one of the Shanghai Cultural Revolution group leaders, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, appeared to have the inside track. Beyond Chang were old associates of Chou, Li Hsien-nien and Yeh Chien-ying. Other military commanders were in the running too; all probably would have been regarded as more seasoned and sophisticated choices for Premier than Hua, a relative newcomer from the provinces.

It is also well to remember that this was the PRC's first succession and transfer of power. Mao as founder and leader of the Party, had held sway for nearly half a century, albeit with some difficulties over the last two decades. It seems probable that the innermost

councils of the CCP were simply unable to effect a smooth transition process not having predicted how losing the two pillars of power in the same year might affect the delicate balance within the party. We have only to recall how Teng disappeared the day after giving Chou's eulogy and how the "gang of four" disappeared less than a month after Mao's death to gauge the desperate leadership scramble as these two titans passed from the scene.

It has been rumored that when the Politburo met to select a Premier to replace Chou-En-lai, it voted 7 for Teng, 6 for Chang, and 1 for Hua. Mao allegedly broke the deadlock by opting for Hua. This, of course, was not "hard intelligence," close to the decisionmaking process, but if such a report were genuine, it would not have occasioned much surprise among those watching the CCP leadership. Accessible sources—cadres, overseas functionaries and diplomats, travellers and the like—are apparently not on the receiving end of such sensitive decisions either.

Clearly, the succession crisis surrounding the loss of Mao and Chou has had no precedent in PRC politics. It is reasonable to assume Peking has had more difficulties resolving it than we have had in gathering and evaluating intelligence on it. There are as yet no discernible patterns to test or to provide guidance. Will Hua's successor come out of Hunan (by way of Shansi), hold sway over agriculture and public security, and use the premiership as stepping stone to Party Chairman? Perhaps not, but, should all these factors be working for one man in the future, we may at least have something to go on. (In June of 1977, Hua relinquished his position as First Secretary in Hunan to an obscure secretary there named Mao Chih-yun. It is the same surname as the Chairman's and he apparently comes from the Chairman's home county.)

Finally, a review of the sources and analyses relating to Hua's rise to power during this crisis period leads to the conclusion that the surprise over Hua's nomination was largely a function of Teng's failure to win the Premiership. Better sources and better analyses would probably not have led us to conclude that Hua was the Premier-designate before Chou died. Just as with Teng's failure to be named Premier in February 1976, knowledgeable PRC sources seemed as genuinely nonplussed as other serious China watchers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Europe and the Soviet Union. We were not analyzing against the tide.

If Hua's prospects were largely obscured by intelligence tracking of more likely candidates, this was not to say that Hua was a cipher in the

intelligence file. The source net had been catching Hua up some 20 years earlier, and, as demonstrated in this paper, our biographic sources reflect Hua's activities and gradual rise to prominence in Hunan up through the Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Piao in September 1971. Thereafter, Hua moved swiftly to national prominence, marshalling his powers as agriculture spokesman, retaining his power base in Hunan, grooming for the Politburo, picking up the Ministry of Public Security and so on, a matter of record and close scrutiny in the intelligence process.

C. Sources in Support of Leadership Analysis. Hua did not fall from the sky nor emerge from behind a stump. He was clearly keyed into the leadership development process in China, and analysts were aware of his presence and potential. Similarly, there were seemingly enough sources to trace Teng's progress, if not his demise. Would a wider or deeper source base have improved analytical assumptions concerning Teng's fall or Hua's rise to power? Surely more might have been gathered, but let us first review what has been available and how it has been used.

How do we look at the leadership in a closed society like the PRC where great efforts are made to dissemble and conceal infighting not only from the outside world but from the Chinese populace as well? Our primary data base derives from press and radio accounts of leadership activity. Major congresses, meetings, communiques, speeches and leadership turnouts, plus media commentary, provide the base line for establishing a leader's standing and function in the hierarchy. Careful monitoring of daily press, radio, and television tells us how often he appears in public, in what pecking order, in what capacity, and with whom. Television appearances or live recordings of a speech sometimes display surface leadership style—flair, assertiveness, authority, policy position, deference patterns or lack of them, and so on.

The appearances of several hundred national and provincial leadership figures in the PRC are chronologically recorded with cumulative computer printouts available for several years running. These compilations have proved especially useful in measuring patterns of behavior, progress, and prominence.

Such overt sources tell us whether a leader's role is broad or narrow, whether he holds party, state and military office or responsibilities, national and regional positions concurrently, and whether he addresses both foreign and domestic policy issues. In retrospect, as in the case of Hua Kuo-feng, it can track the grooming of a potential leader. The Chinese themselves have

demonstrated the importance of media analysis in assessing the position and strength of various players within party and governmental leadership, most notably in regard to graphics revealing the juxtaposition and alignment of the leadership in television cuts or official photographs in newspapers and magazines. Charges that anti-party elements have cropped or altered leadership photos to promote their cause or to undermine someone else's, alert us to the need of watching for small or abrupt shifts of patterns in "family portraits." The Chinese have displayed considerable sensitivity in recalling or removing photographs or speeches of disgraced leaders.

Beyond the media, Hong Kong and Peking prove valuable listening posts for gathering information on Chinese leaders. At the American Consulate in Hong Kong, biographic data are regularly compiled in the Political Section from daily press scanning. The Defense Liaison Office there contributes additional data on PRC military personnel, all of which plugs into the Washington file. Black market media materials, that is PRC press and journals not openly available outside China, are acquired and exploited at the Consulate. Post officers from State, CIA, DIA, and USIS have access to an exceptional array of sources in Hong Kong, which include official and social PRC contacts in media, banking, or business and liaison with diplomatic counterparts at other consulates, which often lead to briefing or debriefing of high level visitors to China and the informal exchange of ideas and information. American businessmen trading with China or traveling to trade fairs and exhibits in Canton or Peking, sometimes detect leadership attitudes toward foreign trade, a key area of leadership controversy.


There is close rapport with the British mission in Hong Kong, including the use of refugee debriefings and association with the UK Regional Information Office, which maintains a small but excellent staff of Chinese analysts, who have kept close tabs and good records on the China leadership picture over many years. The experience, insight, language facility and continuity of key members of the Consulate's own Chinese professional staff have been a valuable asset to analysis and interpretation of PRC leadership behavior there. The Press Monitoring Unit has been translating and indexing PRC newspapers and journals for more than a quarter century.

Clandestine collection in Hong Kong often sheds light on leadership tensions and relationships between Peking and its party or military cadre in the provinces.

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Reports of or receipt of numbered Central Documents from local or mainland cadre briefings often signal major changes in personnel or policy in advance of media announcement or clarify the significance of campaigns already underway. Sources often supply gists of leadership speeches or documents meant for cadre indoctrination but not for media dissemination.

In Hong Kong there have been longstanding China-watching operations like Jesuit Father La Dany's *China News Analysis*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and independent Chinese-language newspapers like *Ming Pao*, all with their own sources of information. Western and Chinese newsmen trade bits of information and speculation with Consulate staff members. Veteran newsmen like *Newsweek's* Sidney Liu and the *Baltimore Sun's* Eddie Wu can add a Chinese dimension to Western interpretation of source data.



We also have the dubious benefit of an endless round of rumors passed along by relatives and travelers concerning infighting behind the scenes

With the USLO Mission in Peking, there is now the opportunity to witness major political events first hand and to participate directly in US official, academic, or business interviews with Chinese leaders. Chinese language officers at the post travel around Peking and to other cities, view posters and rallies as they appear, gauge crowd moods, public security tensions, and the use or presence of troops. They also browse through bookstores and coordinate publications procurement with the Hong Kong Consulate. Excellent reports have come from USLO officers on leadership behavior at meetings they themselves attend or through diplomatic exchange with members from other missions. In particular, there are contacts with Soviet and East European diplomats who do not have Consulates in Hong Kong. Access to the tightly held PRC army newspaper, *Liberation Army Daily*, has been one benefit from such contacts. Meetings with a few carry-over American or European residents in Peking add perspective and insight by dint of their long and trusted associations with Chinese friends or students. Exchanges with *AFP* and *Reuters* correspondents are

useful, together with stories filed by them and the Japanese news services in Peking. Gossip from Chinese staff or servants can be helpful too.

Apart from Hong Kong and Peking, there has been some good third-party intelligence access to PRC diplomatic or other representations from Rangoon, Singapore and Tokyo to Geneva, Tehran, Cairo and the UN Mission in New York. In Taiwan and Japan, keen interest in Chinese developments, coupled with cultural affinities and political familiarity with senior leadership figures in the PRC, has also been of value in our intelligence assessments.

Diplomatic intelligence, our own and that of other services, often gives us an index to a leader's posture and relationship with his peers: how does he handle himself at briefings of foreign visitors; is he comfortable with them, knowledgeable on matters under discussion; is he alert and in good health; does he defer to others, hew woodenly to cliches and well-worn lines; does he speak with conviction and confidence?

In my judgment, most of these source opportunities have been exploited with considerable skill and ingenuity in recent years, and, barring some mass defection at the "gang of four" level, better source data in the HUMINT category is not apt to refine the intelligence product on leadership issues. This is not so much to say our sources are good or sufficient as to acknowledge how difficult it is to reach to the inner recesses of PRC decisionmaking. We are often left with the feeling we know more than the man in the street in Peking and almost as much as the highly placed PRC provincial cadre or diplomatic representative abroad, which, unfortunately, is still to say, "not much."

D. Dangers Inherent in the Source Material. We have a broad range of overt and covert sources then, and, depending on analytical background or experience in reporting, we sometimes ascribe more weight to one type of source than another. In fact, all categories of information, properly sifted and evaluated, can usually complement or corroborate one another and help to refine or reform analytical judgments. With clandestine sources there exists a continuing need to shake down gossip and hearsay, test source reliability and access, and insure they are not just selling things you want to hear. Clever forgeries of "important" documents or speeches sometimes are contrived for sheer market value. Other forgeries and disinformation may originate with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Nationalists, or other activists for varying political reasons. Beyond this, source information may

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originate inside the PRC, yet still be the work of "rumormongers" in the provinces at odds with policymakers in Peking or reflect a dissident line with Peking. The experienced case officer or analyst must constantly evaluate what he acquires, trying to confirm it with alternative or overt sources of information. The Hong Kong Consulate has developed considerable skill in sniffing out forged documents. Recently, machine and mathematical computations have made some headway in verifying authenticity of leadership speeches acquired through clandestine sources.

In the use of overt sources like press and radio, we have had a sense of at least holding the lowest common denominator of official information, a base line of credible data on a totalitarian society in which we assume the media is carefully screened and dominated by the one ruling party. In the decade since the Cultural Revolution, however, this sense of security has been repeatedly undermined. Articles in the press complain that the media have been susceptible to massive and subtle manipulation by anti-party forces. The party paper then does not speak with one voice, and cultural and educational props have frequently been criticized as spears turned against the leadership as well as party programs and goals. Those closest and most loyal to Mao have been found guilty of "waving a red flag to oppose the red flag" and so on.


Similar precautions are necessary in using sources which evaluate a leader by first hand observation, often on the basis of superficial diplomatic contact. We have had what appear to be astute assessments by objective reporters, but political and cultural prejudice or personal vanities may color or distort value judgments. Some of the best political observations of Chinese leaders might occasionally come from Soviet diplomats. We might expect special cultural or political insights from Japanese or overseas Chinese visitors, but it is a fine line to draw between giving such observations more or less credit than they warrant. A New Zealand official schooled in Chinese history and current leadership politics might be better qualified to comment on Chinese history and current leadership behavior than a Southeast Asian diplomat of Chinese extraction with no particular knowledge of Chinese politics, yet the latter might detect certain cultural quirks or slights that could prove significant. Whether he would think them worth relaying or explaining to a Western colleague is still another matter.

A warning note might be sounded too, with regard to contacts with PRC overseas diplomats and their outlook on leadership politics at home. Presumably, the PRC diplomatic staff is carefully chosen and operates from roughly parallel guidelines in discussing PRC politics with foreign contacts. Most PRC diplomats who have chosen to speak with outsiders appear to be strongly pro-Chou or Teng in political orientation; this might merely be the line or it could also mean that those who don't talk to foreigners so readily might hold a different view of leadership politics. If the two-line struggle is reflected in the posting complement of overseas missions, onesided access to a friendly line could inject a distorting effect into our value judgments on leadership politics. These are but a few of the pitfalls faced in using the leadership sources available to us, whether open or confidential.

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E. Data Management



Another source of raw data has been the Hong Kong Consulate translation of newspapers and periodicals from the PRC. The great strength of this service has been the range and depth of source material with a quarter century of good indexing. The great weakness from the intelligence viewpoint has been its slow distribution time, which often makes such materials of little value to current intelligence.

Each office, of course, manages data in accord with its own reporting requirements. This study was,

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however, based largely on data in the leadership files of the Office of Central Reference, where each recorded appearance, speech, intelligence report or commentary on an individual leader is kept on 5x7 cards and listed chronologically. While the volume of chaff with each kernel sometimes overwhelms, the material is readily accessible and reference personnel are extremely knowledgeable and helpful. In general, rapport and communication among analysts, data managers and collectors appear to be good.

F. Some Assumptions in Leadership Analysis. In looking at the Chinese leadership situation over the years, it is apparent that many of the assumptions are identical to those used to assess any other leadership group; others are uniquely Chinese. A few of the more common measures of leadership appraisal are summarized here.

Often, we define a Chinese leader's status in terms of his power base, which might derive from a prominent party history, participation in the Long March, distinction as army commander or commissar or, after 1949, sustained high level administrative experience in one or more provinces or in planning and ministerial responsibilities at the center. To have survived successive purges in the party speaks well for a leader's prowess or agility. A man on the rise in Peking, the provinces, or the army gradually comes to recognized plateaus of attention and influence within the party apparatus.

First secretaries of key provinces, PLA regional commanders and commissars are characteristically seen as having reached a point where they are building or seeking to maintain their "power bases" to rise in the leadership hierarchy. Ideally, the base should not seem too powerful lest it degenerate into its political converse, the "independent kingdom." A great many political careers in China have terminated on the charge that leaders have assembled forces or followings that ignore the larger interests of party or state. Lin Piao, whose power base included a brilliant military record, close association with Mao, and command of the PLA, seemed a model of selfless deference to Mao and the revolution. After his fall, his modesty was said to be simulated and his military reputation fraudulent. Teng's arrogance alone was a factor in bringing him down. Clearly, it is not easy to become a leader in China. CCP infighting over half a century has developed a rich litany of political deviations identified as either left or right opportunism, and an analyst must have some appreciation of how these errors relate to present day leadership

controversy over foreign or domestic policy. Even today, familiarity with Mao's interpretations on these matters is indispensable.

Seasoned leaders at the center, those responsible for introducing key policy issues or campaigns, those who become regular interpreters of national planning and who meet high level foreign visitors, especially those from fraternal parties who regularly appeared with Mao or Chou, obviously enjoy high leadership prospects. Where leaders stand in relation to one another at national ceremonies or with foreign guests is indicative of their status, but such alignments sometimes seem more fluid than static. A given leader may appear fourth or fourteenth, and his position may depend on the event, the visitor, or on which or how many other Chinese leaders appear. There may also be additional matters of protocol of which we are not aware. Tensions among leaders do not prevent them from appearing side by side; protocol surely insists on a facade of unity, and it is probably important to keep tabs on what your opponent is up to and not allow your supporters to think you have lost ground. Close monitoring of leadership activity on TV sometimes betrays leadership differences. I had the opportunity to witness the Chou En-lai funeral in the company of one of our Chinese staff members at the Hong Kong Consulate. An essay might have been written on his observations of the true and false grief displayed by Chou's politburo colleagues at the funeral. In the past certain leaders, including Mao and Lin Piao, would be absent from public view for months with no apparent effect on their political status. They might have been ill, traveling, training, under political investigation or pouting. Peking seldom tells, though feigned illness seems a time-honored political stratagem.

Cumulative biographic data, including psychological studies based on information from all sources can often span several decades. It catalogs highlights of a leader's early civilian and military life, provincial and national level responsibilities, past associations with others in the hierarchy, and so forth. Guarded assumptions can be drawn as to the strength of a man's power base in terms of regional affiliations, high level patrons in Peking, and past relationships and positions within the party and the army. Assets and vulnerabilities can be assessed in light of how a man fared in previous party controversies or major political upheavals, factors which indicate differences or grievances on volatile issues. Regime personnel assignments might consciously place rivals in an offsetting position in a troubled province or military region to counterbalance or dilute political tensions.

For leaders of the Mao-Chou generation, association with Mao and Chou over half a century of party-army history was surely a strong factor in their leadership status, if not always a positive one. Similarly, middle level leaders who identified closely with the "anti-party chieftans" during the last 18 years have often had their aspirations blunted or broken due to the misfortunes of their once high-placed patrons. One of the anomalies in analyzing Chinese leaders comes in weighing the political impact of the octogenarian types with Politburo status. Often presumed to be deaf, blind, lame, or quite fragile, they are dismissed analytically as venerable window-dressing, but as Mao's peers and/or cronies, some have had outstanding military reputations and party histories. They probably have made more impact on junior colleagues in the Chinese milieu than is generally appreciated. Stories float out from time to time which indicate these old men take vigorous exception to certain policies or personalities they dislike. Culturally, their age and experience probably give them political leverage not apparent by their appearance. (The "gang of four" allegedly went to great lengths to disparage and unseat them.)

In the early stages of analyzing the Chinese leadership, we gave considerable attention to common civil war experiences or Field Army associations; provincial cliques were also judged to be the basis of some political alignments. We still talk of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army loyalties and look to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's Second Field Army associations. Mao's native Hunan probably gave fellow Hunanese an edge initially, and we still examine leadership factions from Szechuan, Kwangtung, Shanghai, and so forth. Traditionally, strong dialectical, cultural, and political differences nurtured such cliques. In more recent years, conscious policies of personnel rotation and administrative changes have diffused such regional or unit loyalties, but other policies relating to economic and political decentralization have probably helped to renew or perpetuate them. Military, regional or departmental cliques clustered around leaders other than Mao have been denounced in purge criticism.

On the other hand, long term or close personal affiliation with Mao, or being a native of Hunan, was certainly no assured road to power. Purges in Mao's name have toppled fellow Hunanese Liu Shao-ch'i, close confidant Ch'en Po-ta, and close comrade-in-arms Lin Piao. We shall probably never know whether the political misfortunes of those close to Mao were the arbitrary decisions of a vain, suspicious, and all powerful leader, or the skillful maneuvering of Mao's

real enemies, divesting him of his personal power base. One of the historical allusions sparking controversy in the months before Mao died was debate over the classical tactic of "clearing away those close to the emperor."

After 1958, factors began to figure into analyzing the leadership other than a leader's background. Mao's leap forward was a devastating failure, and his Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai had the temerity to tell him so. Worse, others in the leadership who opposed the leap did so in terms that paralleled criticism coming from the Soviet Union. From that time onward, major policy differences appeared to undermine the stability of China's leadership. Soviet aid was withdrawn. This triggered bitter debate over national economic priorities, national self-reliance, regionalism, the bourgeois military line (weapons vs manpower), revisionism, and so forth. In the fall of 1965, Mao's Cultural Revolution was meant to flush the party of revisionists. Lin Piao's army was eventually called on to restore order after the ouster of Liu Shao-ch'i's forces; then Lin himself was uprooted in an alleged Soviet-oriented plot. Shortly after Lin's fall, rehabilitation of many party leaders purged by the Cultural Revolution got underway, highlighted by Teng's return in April 1973. There was obvious resistance to rehabilitation from those leaders who had benefited from the Cultural Revolution.

As if this incredibly complex mix of leadership politics were not enough, in the 1973-74 period a major campaign began to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius. This provided the opening for scores of long-winded articles on the struggle between Confucians and Legalists in ancient history with some obvious historical and literary allegories and innuendo raised against Mao, Chou, Teng, and others. These articles were also keyed to sharp debates going on within the party over Sino-Soviet relations, the defense budget, foreign trade, rehabilitation, military regional insubordination, and central versus decentralized authority.

China analysts were sometimes sharply divided as to the significance of such allegories in the media. If our analytical assumption is that Mao is all powerful and is in firm control of the media, then it becomes difficult to accept the idea that the party would lay itself open to attack or would have to resort to subterfuge and indirection to deal with opposition in the party.

It has been within this complicated framework that analysts have had to weigh the rapidly fluctuating leadership picture in China. Satire, allegory, irony,

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and innuendo are classical weapons of political infighting in China and have been repeatedly invoked to mask debate over high level political issues. The Cultural Revolution got underway with Yao Wen-yuan's attack on prominent Peking historian Wu Han, who allegedly contrived a Ming Dynasty play to criticize Mao for having dismissed Defense Minister P'eng Te-huai. This time-honored political tactic of indirect criticism is known as "pointing at the mulberry to revile the ash." Some appreciation of how and why these literary and scholastic weapons have been used, before, during, and after the Cultural Revolution should be a rather basic component of the China watcher's analytical equipment. Too often, such historical controversies are dismissed as non-sensical or contradictory by Westerners, even though Chinese set great store by them.

In the early stages of our leadership analysis, the Long March camaraderie of the Chinese leaders was invoked as proof of unanimity at the center and of Mao's commanding presence in the leadership picture; party, people, pen and sword were harnessed to one goal. In retrospect, it is doubtful that the analytical model was ever quite so monolithic. After 1959, Peking was at pains to cleanse the party of impurities at the highest level. Political enemies challenged Mao's judgment, criticized his errors, and called his stewardship into question. These enemies were charged with attempting to subvert party and state, capture the army, seize control over the media, and install Soviet-style revisionism in all spheres of activity. For such crimes, heads rolled among senior members of the party and army bureaucracy.

Events in China sometimes seem to outrun our analytical assumptions regarding the leadership struggle there. This is not necessarily to say models or techniques are invalid or even that better ones are available. For the present, however, we should recognize that our assumptions cannot remain static and are in constant need of testing and definition. The traditional concept of monolithic leadership in China, with all that it implies in terms of foreign policy, national planning, regime stability, and media controls, probably outlived its usefulness long before Mao died.

However much the charges and countercharges re-echo through the various line struggles, it hardly seems justified to dismiss policy issues as largely irrelevant, as mere sticks in the power struggle. Surely the Chinese leadership does wrestle with problems of war and

peace, foreign policy and trade, S&T, national planning priorities, defense strategy and budget allocations, regionalism, and so on. As part of our understanding and appraisal, it should be worthwhile to separate real issues from slander and revenge. Much of this regime's near-term energies will be spent deflating Maoism, while preserving Mao. Never appreciating Moscow's de-Stalinization, Peking will try to blame the "gang of four" for Mao's sins; thus, the gang carried out "fascist dictatorship behind Chairman Mao's back." Already, the first 17 years of Communist rule (1949-65), largely written off during Mao's Cultural Revolution as under the sway of the Liu-Teng line, is being quietly reassessed.

The Chinese themselves have consistently invoked the concept of "two-line struggle," Mao's revolutionary line in life and death struggle with a Soviet-type revisionist opposition. Whatever the distortions or dissembling inherent in this model, it has come closer to explaining the rounds of high level purges and continuing tensions within the Chinese leadership over the last 20 years than anything else available. It was clearly Mao's belief that the Chinese revolution needed two-line struggle to avert bureaucratic atrophy. He never came round to tolerating a "loyal opposition," however, and it is doubtful his successor will either.

It may be too soon to judge Hua Kuo-feng's leadership style, other than to note that he apparently means to steer clear of the "collective leadership" many thought likely to bridge the gap left by the loss of Mao and Chou. It has yet to be determined whether the highly centralized leader image Hua now projects is the wisdom of ancient polity, symbolizing a united empire, or the style of an adroit politician. Our cumulative file on Hua suggests he is a well-grounded opportunist, more disposed to accumulate and hold power than to delegate it and a man who shrewdly dispensed with all likely rivals at both the provincial and national levels while securing the backing of the army and public security apparatus. As a relatively young, competent, and experienced administrator, with no strong factional history, Hua has seemed to cash in on disarray in Peking following the demise of Mao and Chou. We may wonder whether the media's repeated description of Hua's quick and decisive dispatch of the "gang of four" is not meant to contrast with Mao's inability to cope with the gang and whether the smooth, conciliatory, and patient Hua portrayed in other propaganda themes is not meant to

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contrast with the unbending and abrasive image of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. There may be a new leadership style in the making despite Chairman Mao's long shadow.

CONCLUSIONS

I would conclude that sources, services, and analyses on the Chinese leadership problem have been surprisingly good and resourceful despite the opaque and complex character of our target. There is need to widen perceptions and perhaps better apply or digest what we now have, but China analysts had zeroed in particularly well on the key issues of the radical-moderate controversy in China, and its principal protagonists were well known. Analysts had hold of the very journals and papers (Shanghai's *Study and Criticism*, *Historical Research*, *Kwangming Daily*), the very articles and pseudonyms, that are now denounced as instruments of the "gang of four." In August, 1976, an OPR study on Teng predicted that it could only be a matter of time after Mao's imminent death that the radicals would be unseated by centrist and rightist forces in China. In September Mao died, and, in October, centrist and rightist forces unseated the Shanghai radicals.

One thing that the fall of Teng and the rise of Hua should have taught us, however, is a need to approach the target with reserve and caution, not to pretend to more knowledge than we have, nor to rely too heavily on favorite models or pre-conceived notions of how the decisionmaking process works. Some of our assumptions have come under increasing challenge in recent years and may be more challenged in the post-

Mao era. Policymakers should resist asking the impossible and analysts should resist providing it.

For example, we would like to assume that party media come under centralized party control and that lines and policies may be authoritatively validated at any given time. But the March 1977 issue of the CCP theoretical journal *Red Flag* carried an article that denounced Yao Wen-yuan's use of the journal to attack Mao, Chou, and the party. In June 1958, Mao invested this journal as the voice of the party, and its first chief-editor was Mao's close advisor Ch'en Po-ta. Ch'en later headed up the Cultural Revolution Group. Later still, the same Ch'en was named arch-accomplice and co-conspirator with Lin Piao in plots directed against Mao and the CCP. Ch'en, Lin, and Yao were all reckoned particularly close to Mao. Not too many intelligence scenarios for China adequately cover such perplexities, and it is probably best to acknowledge it. There have been sharp differences of opinion among China analysts in government and academic life as to what such things signify. These differences can help sharpen perceptions and improve intelligence products.

Finally, it should be noted that this study is restricted to the narrow facet of leadership politics, possibly the most difficult part of China-watching in terms of predictability. But considerable analysis goes on in other spheres too—economic planning and production, foreign policy, military strength and posture, relations with the US and the Soviet Union, Science and technology, regionalism, and so forth. Often the data base for such subjects is not much better than for studying the leaders. Still, these collateral studies contribute significantly to our overall assessment of leadership politics in China.

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MEMBERS OF REVIEW PANEL

Joe Borich, State/INR/REA

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

Charles L. Desaulniers, DIO/East Asia and Pacific

Dick Hart, State/EA/PRCM

25X1A

Michael Oksenberg, NSC

Colonel A. K. Richardson, OSD/ISA/EA and PR

25X1A

Dr. William W. Whitson, Library of Congress

APPENDIX

Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
1956		
Oct	FBIS	Identified as Director, Hunan Cultural & Educational Department; speaks on illiteracy
1958		
May		Appears as Vice-chairman, Hunan Provincial Council (PC)
Jul		Elected Vice Governor, Hunan
1959		
20 Jan		Identified Vice-chairman, Hunan S&T
1 Mar		Reports on food grains
12 Aug		Presides over finance and trade conference
8 Sep		Reports on purchasing and marketing
16 Oct		Reports on finance and trade; identified as secretary, Hunan Provincial Committee
8 Dec		Approved as one of 396 CCP CC members
26 Dec		Elected vice-chairman of 2nd CCP CC
1960		
Jan		Speaks on waste products, national conference in Ch'ang-sha
Jan		Welcomes Panchen Erdeni to Ch'ang-sha
Mar		Speech and summary report, finance and trade
19 Mar		One of 27 Presidium members, Hunan party congress
23 Mar		Speech on grain work
31 Dec		Speech, third session, Provincial Party Congress
1963		
22 Dec		Attends memorial service for Lo Jung-huan, listed fifth of five named among 1200 attending
1964		
29 Feb		Leads Hunan cadres to Kwangtung to study advanced agricultural experience
6 Mar		Attends meeting for poor and lower middle peasants; Chang P'ing-hua speaks
8 Mar		Attends banquet for advanced farm workers
16 Sep		Delivers opening speech, Hunan Third Party Congress
17 Sep		Speaks to congress on work of PC; sums up two years socialist construction; socialist education movement, achievements, adjustments, future tasks
22 Sep		Elected one of 117 Hunan delegates to NPC, in company with other Hunanese at the national leadership level; Li Fu-ch'un, etc. Also re-elected vice governor
23 Sep		NCNA reports Hunan Congress and Hua's speech

Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
1964		
26 Sep	FBIS	Hunan PC convenes; Hua gives important speech on grain work
3 Oct		Speaks at first militia training demonstration
7 Oct		Speaks at public security cultural festival regional conference; military & security officials from six other provinces attend; Yeh Chien-ying and Central-South military leaders "deliver important instructions"
17 Nov		Welcomes touring Laotians; gives banquet
9 Dec		Attends "5-good" industrial and communications congress, Ch'ang-sha
1965		
1 Feb		Gives speech, spring festival
21 Feb		Presides over PC & CCP CC session
8 Mar		Gives important speech, notes acute class struggle, town & countryside
21 Mar		Attends youth conference
11 Apr		Receives actors from Sinkiang
26 Apr		Gives banquet for Rumanian visitors
1 May		Speaks at May Day rally; points to US "imperialism" in Vietnam, bombing of DRV, threat to China too; US bound to fail
14 May		Gives important speech, industry & communications conference
11 Jun		Gives report on half-farming, half-schooling
15 Jun		Gives reports, with others, at farm construction conference
28 Jun		Attends militia demonstration with military personnel; a protest against US 15 year "occupation" of Taiwan
30 Jun		Hua named in charge of irrigation project for three counties in Hunan, including home counties of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i
4 Jul		Attends Central South Bureau (CSB) film work conference; to carry out instructions of CSB Chief, T'ao Chu
19 Jul		Attends 3rd session of Provincial Party Congress; Main theme: Aid Vietnam, resist US; gives report on supporting Vietnam and future tasks
26 Jul		Hua and Chang P'ing-hua inspect and approve irrigation project work
15 Aug		Meets Vietnamese delegation with other Hunan leaders
21 Aug		Hua presides over telephone conference on finance and trade
31 Aug		Meets athletes
1 Sep		Receives mobile medical teams
2 Sep		Gives speech on Vietnamese 20th anniversary; listed first among four provincial leaders

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
4 Oct	FBIS	First stage of irrigation project completed; Hua meets and congratulates participants
9 Nov		Attends Ch'ang-sha youth festival
21 Nov		Conference on agricultural brigades; first of its kind with 1200 brigades represented; held on instructions from CSB
<i>1966</i>		
3 Jan		Attends PLMP meeting; Chang speaks
18 Jan		Speaks at spring festival; US trying to reverse failures in Vietnam; clamors for test of strength with China; China would resolutely defeat
21 Feb		Hears speech at women's forum; which reports US "trying to invade China"
21 Mar		Gives important report on finance & trade
9 Jun		Opening of Shao-shan project; CSB Chief T'ao Chu, others attend; Hua gives report—a victory for Mao thought and defeat for Teng To group; T'ao Chu claims project one of major irrigation works in PRC, built by people in birthplaces of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i
9 Jul		Celebrates opening of new railroad connection to Mao's birthplace
23 Jul		Hua listed first in Vietnam rally
28 Jul		Speaks on need to follow CSB instructions on Mao study; large group led to Kwangtung to study model experiences; criticizes Kao Cho as one of the "freaks" in Hunan
13 Aug		Receives masses in support of CCP CC Communique
21 Sep		Sees Vietnamese acrobats together with Chang P'ing-hua
27 Sep		Sends off National Day delegation to Peking Missing from September 1966 to September 1967
<i>1967</i>		
18 Sep		Speaks on harvest work as member of preparatory committee for Hunan revolutionary committee
16 Sep		Preparatory group established; PLA Commander Li Yuan listed as Chairman; Hua and Chang Po-sen listed as leaders of group.
18 Sep		Attends rally to acclaim Chiang-ch'ing's 5 September speech.
26 Sep		Attends rally on Mao visit to Ch'ang-sha; important instructions on Hunan; Li Yuan speaks
Sep	SCMP 4070-10-12	One of three to meet Mao on Ch'ang-sha visit; Li and Hua meet Hunan Red Guard complainants in Peking; Red Guard press alludes to 2 June 1966 meeting as "bad"; Hua had appeared with T'ao Chu at this irrigation project meeting
1 Oct		Attends National Day rally, Ch'ang-sha
17 Oct		Attends congress which hits at "reactionary left" in Ch'ang-sha; Li Yuan speaks
21 Oct		Hua speaks on Mao-study in Hunan, PLA; Chang Po-sen also speaks

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
Oct	SCMP 4163, RG Press	Attacks man belonging to "May 16 Group" who opposed Chou En-lai; man linked to former Hunan first secretary Chou Hsiao-chou (P'eng Te-huai clique) and Hua's friend, Chang P'ing-hua
19 Nov		Li Yuan, Hua criticize top party person in Hunan, cite P'eng Te-huai, T'ao Chu, Wang Jen-chung and efforts by P'eng to turn Hunan into anti-Mao base
26 Nov		Li and Hua speak at preparatory committee for congress of workers; Hua cited as vice-chairman
1968		
2 Feb		Hua speaks at study group rally of 100,000
5 Feb		Greets study group return from Peking
22 Feb		Appears at rally of 200,000 to hail great alliance
26 Feb		Speaks at Mao study rally of 50,000
3 Mar		Welcomes return of military district study group from Peking
9 Apr		Hunan Revolutionary Committee formed; Li Yuan addresses rally as Chairman; Hua and others address rally as vice-chairman and leading cadre.
12 Apr		Greets visitors from Vietnam, praises their battle against US "imperialism"
16 Apr		Conference on resuming education in Chu-chou; talks with school representatives
22 Apr		Speaks at Mao activist meeting; criticizes Hunan capitalist roader, Wang Yen-chun
29 May		Speaks at struggle rally against Wang, major capitalist roader in Hunan; Wang's confession insincere, really a counter-attack against Mao-Lin headquarters; Chinese Khrushchev's agent in Hunan
4 Jun		Speaks at railway conference; in support of American Negroes, Afro-American struggle; reads Mao statement
5 Jul		Greets return of study group from Peking; PLA units convey Mao's solicitude
7 Aug		Speaks on coal conference by telephone
18 Sep		Attends district committee formation; reads instructions of Hunan Revolutionary Committee (RC)
22 Sep		Attends and speaks at coal conference; reports by others as well
1969		
5 Jan		Presides over conference on implementing Mao instructions; expresses concern over class enemies
8 Jan		Speaks as Vice-Chairman, Hunan RC, at new Shao-shan district meeting
16 Jan		Attends "learn from PLA" congress
24 Jan		Attends Hunan Military District Mao-study session
29 Jan		Attends rally for construction of Mao Memorial Hall
5 Mar		Attends rally to protest Soviet military intrusion

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
1 Apr		Named to 176 member Presidium of CCP Ninth Party Congress
1 Apr		Reported on rostrum at Tien-an-men
9 May		One of six to make reports on Ninth Party Congress, after Li Yuan
12 May		Makes opening speech at Hunan Party Congress
12 May	OCI	With Ninth Party Congress, April 1969, Hua outranks Li Yuan, his superior in Hunan; Hua named to CCP Central Committee; Li Yuan only named as an alternate
24 Jul		Gives banquet for Albanian ambassador
25 Sep		Named to Hunan delegation to Peking for National Day; meets Pakistan ambassador with Li Yuan and others
3 Oct		Reported at National Day festivities, Peking
8 Oct		Gives important report on work plans
11 Oct		Gives banquet for Guineans in Ch'ang-sha
2 Nov		Speaks at farm production meeting
8 Nov		Gives important report at party rectification meeting
15 Nov		Important speech at Industry and Communications meeting
23 Dec		Speeches on finance and trade, Hunan military activists
1970		
30 Jan		Report on small local industries, county level
8 Mar		Women's Day speech
Jun		Visits small factories
23 Jun		Delivers "important instructions" on farming
1 Jul		Dedicates open hearth furnace at Hsiangtan; speaks at ceremony as "Acting Chairman" of Hunan RC
18 Jul		Gives instructions at news reporting conference
19 Jan	OCI	Friction between Hua and Li Yuan over PLA political role in Hunan. Li came into Hunan as Commander, 47th Army in August 1967, midst of Cultural Revolution
3 Aug		Army Day speech in Ch'ang-sha; particularly high praise for Lin Piao as Mao's best and most loyal comrade-in-arms; speech also denounces US "imperialism" in Vietnam
27 Sep		Attends militia conference
1 Oct		Delivers main speech at Hunan National Day rally
9 Oct		Speech on technical innovations
14 Dec	British Foreign Office	Gives report as "acting head of nucleus group"
22 Dec		Responds to Peking Embassy query for information on Hua: Essentially a civilian... brief background on career...
1971		
1 Jan		Meets Vietnamese delegation as First Secretary, Hunan Party Committee; rally for NFL 10th anniversary

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
17 Jan		As First Secretary and Acting Chairman, organizes PLA comfort teams
3 Feb		Gives important speech at Ch'ang-sha Party Congress
27 Feb		Gives report to activist congress on "four good" campaign on Mao thought
1 May		Appears in Peking for May Day
9 Nov		At Peking airport to see off UN delegation; cited among "leading members of various departments"; second after Keng Piao
12 Nov	OCI	Provincial leader moving up? Identified 9 Nov as leading member at central government and party level. Reflects civilian ascendancy in post-Lin crisis. Unusual that Li Yuan as first secretary in May 1970, when army conservatives were supplanting radicals in most other provinces. Perhaps good indicator of trends following Lin ouster. Hua's strength vis-a-vis remaining army conservative, Pu Chan-ya, is dubious
13 Nov		Meets Japanese activists in agriculture with Ch'i Teng-kuei; participates as "leading member" with Vietnamese negotiating team
20 Nov		Listed among leading members of Chinese party and government; named 10th after Chou-en-lai; listed 8th in leadership turnout for Albanians
Nov	ACG/HK	Observes that Hunan congress first held after fall of Lin Piao; Mao's home province—probably orchestrated from Peking; congress significant as pacesetter and model; Hua called to post at the center, appears regularly, leaving subordinates in charge in Hunan
23 Dec		With leadership to greet return of UN delegation
1972		
11 Mar		Attends Chang Kuo-hua funeral as leading member
30 Mar		Attends Hsieh Fu-chih's funeral
13 Apr		Attends Chen Cheng-jen's funeral
16 Apr		Attends Tseng Shan funeral
6 Jun		Listed 8th after Chou En-lai at Vietnamese reception
7 Jun	ACG/HK	Notes Hua more prominent since fall of Lin Piao; Hua and two others clustered and reported to suggest their elevation to Politburo status. Seem set apart and above others in departmental functions
7 Jul		Listed among party and state leaders at athletic event, 9th after Chou
	FBIS/Okinawa	Canton TV editorial report; camera closes to show Hua with Chou, Chiang-ch'ing, Yeh Chien-ying, other top leaders, awarding prizes
1972		
31 Jul		Attends army day banquet
Oct	USIS/HK <i>Current Scene</i>	Comments on rise of Hua and Wang Hung-wen; stand above ministerial and department heads; active in Peking since November 1971; note work on irrigation project


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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
		and memorial hall in Mao's home county. Also speculates on Hua's probable role in eliminating Li Yuan, his superior in Hunan; Li out by April, Hua "acting" in July. April 1969 Congress Hua outpoints Li to gain Central Committee, to outrank him in Party
19 Nov		Hua identified as Political Commissar, Canton military region (MR) Acting Chairman, Hunan RC
21 Nov		Hua leads Cambodians to Mao birthplace, also Albanians and Nepalese
22 Nov	7838—ACG/HK	Hua named as political commissar suggests strengthening of central control over Lin Piao's former Canton stronghold; first appearance noted back in Hunan since November 1971
24 Nov	OCI	Hua returns Hunan as political commissar; previously outranked by Pu Chan-ya; new title removes embarrassing situation; apparent move to override remaining Lin Piao forces guided from Canton. Pu closely associated with Huang Yung-sheng, Lin's ex-Chief of Staff and former Commander, Canton MR. Places civilian Hua over military in a significant position of power
Nov	ACG/DLO/HK	Hua as political commissar provides greater control over Canton, probably more administration from Ch'ang-sha
27 Dec		Gives important report on agriculture; identified as Hunan First Secretary, Canton Commissar, Acting Chairman, Hunan RC
1973		
9 Feb	Traveller report	Hua still retaining his 4 positions in Hunan
20 Feb	OCI	Hua takes new regional titles and leaves Peking to return to Hunan; indicates he may be returning to stay—to ride a smaller horse
12 Apr		Re-appears in Peking for Sihanouk visit
3 May	China News Summary/PR/HK	Former First Secretary Chang P'ing-hua returns to Hunan as secretary; after which First Secretary Hua returns to Peking; Hua and Chang close before Cultural Revolution; Hua Chang's subordinate then
5 May	Br JSIS/HK	Posters seen refer to purge of deputy political commissar Pu Chan-ya as pro-Lin Piao; shortly after, Hua returns to Hunan, brings back Chang P'ing-hua from Shansi
10 May		Meets Japanese agricultural delegation in Peking
8 Jun	ACG/HK 25X1X	Listed 10th among leaders saying farewell to Vietnamese; indication that Hua responsible for agriculture in meeting with Japanese and Korean agricultural groups
11 Jul		Chou En-lai interview that Chou said he would be meeting visitors less; "new generations of Chinese and Japanese must come to know one another." Chou cited those in Chinese successor group as Li Hsien-nien, Wang Hung-wen, Hua Kuo-feng, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and a Wang (fnu)
11 Jul	ACG/HK	Hua meets still another agricultural delegation; his political fortunes may be keyed to his success or failure with agricultural problems

Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
28 Aug		Hua elected one of 148 members of Presidium of CCP 10th Party Congress; one of 195 to CCP CC
31 Aug	ACG/HK Bio 25X1A	Hua elected to Politburo at Congress
1974		
17 Apr	 USIS	Hua reported to have taken two or three trips to Canton in connection with anti-Confucius, anti-Lin campaign (PLPK) Similar report; trip allegedly in connection with criticism of Huang Yung-sheng, ex-PLA Chief of Staff (Provincial newspapers from Canton corroborate fact Huang being criticized behind scenes)
17 Jun	Reuters, Peking	Posters attack Hua by name but taken down less than 24 hours later. Posters attack two of Hua's subordinates in Hunan
17 Jun	0997—USLO/Peking	Report poster attacks on Hua and Wu Te; charge Hua suppressed results of cultural revolution, blocked PLPK campaign, ignored those who became part of leadership as result of CR; ignored Wang Hung-wen's report on party constitution; foreigners permitted to photograph posters, given parking and interpreters
18 Jun	NIB	Comment on poster attacks: Democracy, PRC-style; not a purge; those posters that criticize by name removed
21 Jun	OCI	Report poster attacks the work of radical elements from Hunan which strongly suggest Hua not in radical camp (Poster attacks, in general, authorized by central directive in late May)
24 Jun		Hua meets with Albanians and is only Chinese leader named
25 Jun		Hua appears as Politburo member with Wu Te and Yao Wen-yuan at Albanian dance performance (after poster criticism)
25 Jun	1004—USLO/Peking	Posters attack Hua, link to killings and suppression in Hunan in late stages of CR; posters removed; one attacking military commander Yang Ta-i by name, left standing
15 Jul		Hua listed first in meeting with Albanians
16 Jul		First to meet with Cameroons; identified in Politburo
29 Jul		Travellers say Hua criticized in Ch'ang-sha posters too
30 Jul	1223—USLO	Rumanians claim Hua definitely politburo man responsible for agriculture; Shang being groomed for premier, Wang for party boss
Jul	ACG/HK	Hua boss for agriculture; takes center stage at meetings; minister of agriculture defers to Hua
31 Jul		Listed 12th in leadership turn-out for Army Day
2 Aug	AFP/Peking	Criticism of Hunan opera "Song of the Gardener" seen as possible attack on Hua; opera had allegedly vilified education policy since CR

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
1974		
2 Aug	1342—USLO	Soviet military attaché claims he saw posters criticizing Hua in Ch'ang-sha from train window
5 Aug	OCI	Cite Rumanian source on Hua as politburo man for agriculture. Intercept also indicates Hua member of State Council, filling formal position in higher bureaucracy
2 Sep	ACG/HK	Named at airport for visiting Nigerians without title
2 Sep	25X1A	Listed 2nd to Li Hsien-nien, as a politburo member in meeting Vietnamese
10 Sep	[REDACTED]	Hua identified as co-chairman of national level investigatory commission to determine whether PRC ready for another leap forward
11 Sep		Listed 3rd after Li and Ch'en Hsi-lien in meeting Nigerians
1 Oct	25X1A	Third among three groups of leaders mingling for National Day, after Chu Te and Yao Wen-yuan; and 11th among leaders in evening celebrations
2 Oct	[REDACTED]	Hua's expressed interest in exporting coal and oil to Japan
5 Oct		First in meeting Sri Lankans and in escorting Nigerian CinC
12 Nov		Listed first in meeting with Vietnamese telecommunications group
10 Dec	USLO	Hua referred to as "top party man in agriculture" in quoting him on mention of PRC 40 million ton grain reserve
1975		
8 Jan	USLO	Soviet counselor feels Mao's unhappy wife did not gain government position at NPC. <i>Feels Hua Mao's man</i> . Sees showdown coming between radicals and moderates. Saw abolition of Procurate as strengthening Hua's hand in strongest arm of central control, i.e., making Hua's position as Minister of Public Security stronger. Hua was Mao's man early on; sees Mao using public security against Chou and moderates
15 Jan	809—ACG/HK	Comment on NPC: <i>Chang, Teng and Hua emerge as men to watch</i>
15 Jan		Listed 15th in wreath laying for Li Fu-ch'un funeral
17 Jan	ACG/Bio/HK	Appointed Minister of Public Security
18 Jan	25X1A	Listed 6th of 12 vice premiers under Chou
28 Jan	[REDACTED]	Report of Hua speech on great leap forward for fifth five year plan; Hua cited improvements planned for agriculture; <i>imported chemical fertilizers and plants as base for good agricultural increase</i> ; praised Hopei and criticized Kansu on agricultural practices (speech circulated end of 1974)
Jan	1071—ACG/HK	Hua curiously continues to hold both agricultural and public security responsibilities

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
21 Feb	NZ	NZ Minister finds Hua engaging politician; if the steel fist, wears a velvet glove; Hua: self-reliance does not mean foreign trade not wanted
25 Feb	306—USLO	NZ Minister impressed by Hua's knowledge and personal interest in agriculture; obviously continues to manage both agriculture and public security. Agricultural minister Sha Feng close to and deferential toward Hua
3 Mar	OCI	Citing NZ report; power concentrated in a few hands; <i>obviously makes Hua busy and important</i>
18 Mar	486—USLO	Amnesty for Soviet helicopter crew; Hua's role as public security minister enhanced; signals his continued rise to prominence
19 Mar	2860—ACG/HK	Teng/Hua activities in wake of Liaoning earthquake indicate their central role and seriousness of quake. NZ Ambassador impressed with Hua; well informed, leaned more to Chou and outside world than to Mao and young xenophobes
9 Apr	25X1A [REDACTED]	Cadres sense Hua highly regarded by Chou En-lai
1 May	[REDACTED]	Tenth in leadership turn-out for May Day
22 May	[REDACTED]	significance of public security post going to the "radical" Hua while all other ministries go to bureaucratic veterans
1 Aug	25X1A [REDACTED]	Sixth in Army Day reception: Yeh, Teng, Chang, Li, Ch'en, Hua
19 Aug	[REDACTED]	Hua said to personally intervene in capacity as Public Security Minister to investigate alleged assassination attempts against Canton and Ch'ang-sha leaders
27 Sep		Hua presiding over Tachai conference confirms his continuing senior responsibility for agriculture
29 Sep	OCI	Hua in charge of major conference at Tachai again signals his importance to agricultural policy
11 Sep		Hua leads delegation to Tibet to celebrate 10th anniversary
25 Oct		Meets Danish S&T delegation
4 Nov	FCTA4/257	Taipei assessment: Hua a "ruthless operative" on Mao's agricultural front; called up to Peking same time as Wang Hung-wen; long service in Mao's home county, close to Mao. Mao obviously had to approve Hua in public security post; Hua may also be on Military Commission
10 Nov	14087—ACG/HK	Local NCNA official: Hua had varied duties because he was a vice-premier, a jack of all trades, composite role. Hua also "among vice-premiers in best physical condition"
12 Nov	13602—ACG/HK	Hua attends high level coal conference
29 Nov	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Agriculture keystone of Chinese development; US should send agricultural expert to head USLO

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment	
	25X1A	25X1X	
28 Nov	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]: "Tachai campaign fundamental turning point for PRC;" stressed importance of Hua's report	
Nov	ACG/HK Bio for Pres. Trip	Hua: Politburo man in charge of agriculture; has public security role; evidence of his participation in two security investigations; cite NZ judgment of Hua as adroit politician, agreeable, not doctrinaire, almost engaging. Lhasa trip demonstrates importance	
1976			
8 Jan	25X1A	Hua listed 10th after Mao in funeral committee for Chou En-lai	25X1X
23 Jan	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] comment: Thought neither Teng nor Chang in running for premiership; Hua "unfathomable" but active and much trusted by Mao	
26 Jan	[REDACTED]	NZ Ambassador more impressed with Hua than Chang Ch'un-ch'iao; alludes to Hua's feline strength; a man who knew his staff. Ambassador long heard Hua man to watch but did not believe until he met him; saw him as alert and on the ball.	
29 Jan	25X1A	Hua gives banquet for visiting Rumanians	25X1X
4 Feb	[REDACTED]	25X1X Teng would succeed Chou; according to [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; Chang lacks experience, though Teng not so strong without Chou	25X1X
7 Feb		PRC UN representative predicts that Teng will be premier	
7 Feb	NCNA 25X1A	Hua Kuo-feng announced as acting premier; 6th ranked vice-premier, 11th ranked Politburo member	
8 Feb	[REDACTED]	Overseas Chinese with good diplomatic contacts: Hua's appointment was Mao's decision; Teng had made a mistake	
9 Feb	OCI	Peking junior official alludes to Hua as a "nobody." Japanese doubt Hua's staying power; cite lack of power base, ignorance of industry and foreign affairs	
9 Feb	OCI 25X1A	Hua appointment as "acting premier" a setback for Teng, "who had full endorsement of Chairman Mao at each step of his return to power."	25X1X
10 Feb	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Hua named acting premier in 20-25 January meeting of politburo; Mao's personal recommendation. Occasions general surprise in Canton	
11 Feb	0236—USLO	Soviets in Peking "completely surprised" by Hua appointment	
11 Feb	4167—Paris 25X1A	French very surprised; convinced that Teng very sure of himself in last stages of Chou's illness	
19 Feb	[REDACTED]	Hua nominated by Mao, approved by Politburo	
20 Feb	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] All cadre in their unit taken completely by surprise at Hua's appointment	25X1X

Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment
on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
	25X1A	
25 Feb		Hua appointment by Mao, according to Central Directive #1-1976
26 Feb		[REDACTED]: highly regarded in Hunan after restoring agriculture there in early 1960's; personally commended by Mao, regarded able administrator with Mao's support; respected by intellectuals whom he protected during Cultural Revolution; also protected Chang P'ing-hua; regarded as moderate but active behind scenes, no factions; Mao felt Hua needed to preserve agriculture and no enemies in Hunan or Peking. Shy, effective in small groups
26 Feb		Japan: Report that PRC first secretary in European embassy found it difficult to believe that Teng had done anything wrong—in context of Hua's surprise appointment
27 Feb	DLO/HK	Businessman's report on return from trip to Peking of remarks attributed to Teng after the Tachai Conference in October: Teng spoke of Hua's bigger responsibilities in future, of Hua's role at Tachai, his vision, indefatigable spirit, so essential to great work load and responsibilities he would have to bear in the future
11 Mar	0461—USLO	Soviet diplomat notes that public security ministry has controlling function within PLA; Hua has his watchdogs in the army, some known, some not; information supplied by PLA border crossers into USSR
	25X1A	
15 Mar		European NCNA official says Hua solid; predicts Hua will take over all Teng's functions, including military
9 Apr	INR/State	Hua appointment as premier and first vice chairman also suggests he will succeed Mao. No power base may be an asset; has Mao's favor and is an able administrator
	25X1A	
30 Apr		[REDACTED] st Hua's easy and sincere manner with Teng, who too clever and always puts you on guard. Very favorably impressed with Hua
Apr	3632/3/76	[REDACTED] Hua appointment sheer luck; 99 percent of common people in PRC never heard of Hua. He thought Teng should be rightful premier
11 May	USLO	British impression: Able administrator in job far too big for him; spoke extemporaneously yet seemingly from pre-set script; not flexible, unwilling to depart from script
24 May	2566—Singapore	Lee Kuan observation: Hua very anti-Teng; surmised Hua instrumental in Teng's removal (Lee admittedly not well versed in PRC internal politics)
	25X1A	
May		Hua could join either side; can't be classified radical or moderate
3 Jun	2740—Singapore	Malaysians impressed with Hua's authority and confidence; displayed familiarity with domestic affairs, looked to Ch'iao Kuan-hua for foreign affairs
18 Jun	9270—Tokyo	Japanese say Hua solid but not yet in Chou's league; cautious, lacked knowledge in foreign affairs, as Hua readily admitted

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Biographic Data, Sources, and Analytical Comment on Hua Kuo-feng (Continued)

Date	Source/Office	Information/Comment
	25X1A	25X1X 25X1X
23 Jun	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] Hua protected higher education in Hunan during Cultural Revolution. Skillful at switching from one faction to another. After Chang P'ing-hua fell in 1966-67 as Hunan First Secretary, Hua shifted to red guard faction supported by Lin Piao. But Shanghai group in Peking sponsored more radical faction and Hua switched again; faction enjoyed Chiang Ch'ing support hence Hua did not suffer Chang's fate. Mao visited Ch'ang-sha in September 1967 & publicly praised Hua; in 1974 Hua sent to investigate Pu Chan-ya role in Hunan; Pu close to Lin Piao group; Hua submitted report accusing Pu complicity with Lin & Pu dismissed as result
Jun	25X1X	[REDACTED] Elevation of Hua to premiership came as total surprise; asked group of students there who new premier was to be and no one came up with the right answer
30 Jun	ACG/HK 25X1A	Australians found Hua impressive; good face, handled questions smoothly, with or without Ch'iao Kuan-hua
2 Jul	[REDACTED] 25X1X	[REDACTED] Hua shrewd, capable, keeps options open; does not rely on Ch'iao for foreign affairs; still retains public security reins; would not cross swords with Shanghai crew while Mao still alive; his sanction of anti-Teng campaign would not extend to criticism of Teng's supporters
6 Jul	7852—ACG/HK	Senior PRC spokesman warns against taking signed articles like those of radical Liang Hsiao too seriously; not necessarily authoritative
7 Jul	2916—Katmandu	No question but what Hua would succeed Mao successfully; Hua solid and respected
Jul	25X1A	Views of Soviet Sinologist: To US academic; recalls association with Hua in 1959-60; thought to be pragmatic and on good terms with Chou En-lai
20 Sep	[REDACTED]	Hua a natural choice for Chairman (to succeed Mao)
25X1A	[REDACTED]	Collective leadership likely; with Hua, Chang, Yeh; Hua would relinquish Premiership to Chang, if pressed. (Surmise of HK leftist)
9 Oct	18866—ACG/HK	Hua's high status as responsible for editing Mao's works; Japanese newsmen dubious of Hua's capabilities only an accident of circumstances, has no power base

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